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rHL STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 18975 
THOMAS LOWELL SPRAGUE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
--0000000--
APPELLANT 'S BRIEF 
--0000000--
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a criminal conviction entered in the 
Sixth Judicial District Court in and for Sanpete County, State of 
Utah, trial by jury, the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The defendant was found guilty of one count of distribution 
of marijuana in violation of Section 58-37-8, Utah Code 
Annotated. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks the reversal and dismissal of said judgment 
on the basis of entrapment or, in the alternative, for an order 
of this Court requiring a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State's case consisted of one witness, James Walker 
Tauffer. Mr. Tauffer, an undercover agent for Sanpete County, 
l 
made the first contact with Sprague on August 19, 1982 at approx 
imately 10:00 p.m. The contact was initated by Officer Tauffe 1 
in Manti (T. 78). Sprague was sitting conversing with a friu"I 
nothing illegal was observed by the officer (T. 67 L. J-91. 
Tauffer and Spann had decided to make contacts with various 
people in Sanpete County as undercover agents. They possessed no 
prior knowledge of Mr. Sprague nor of the friend he was visiting. 
No reason was given as to why Mr. Sprague was isolated, except 
that Spann and Tauffer observed Sprague and his friend talking at 
the park (T. 67). The defendant was not discussing marijuana (T. 
80 L. 9), nor did he bring up the subject of marijuana. The 
officers possessed no knowledge or suspicion that Sprague was 
involved in the distribution of controlled substances. 
After some preliminary and informal discussions, Tauffer 
brought the subject up asking Sprague if he knew where Tauffer 
could get a quarter ounce of marijuana. Sprague told Tauffer 
that his best bet would be to go to Provo (T. 89 L. 19-25 ). 
After further discussion, Sprague thereafter told the officer 
that he, Sprague, would see what he could do. Sprague took no 
action to obtain any substance as a result of the first contact 
by the officers. 
After realizing no results from his first contact, Mr. 
Tauffer sought out Sprague once again, this time on August 27, 
1982 at 2:46 p.m. (Sprague did not initiate either the first or 
the second meeting and no communications between the officer and 
Sprague had occurred between the first and second meeting.) 
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Tauffer, in company with fellow undercover agent Ed Spann, 
went to defendant's place of employment, Mr. Chainsaw, in Manti, 
"'He the defendant maintained a part-time job. Tauffer and 
Spann again brought up the subject of marijuana--asking him about 
trying to buy a quarter ounce, if he knew where they could get 
some. Sprague then told them he was going to Gunnison and he 
might be able to get some. A tentative meeting was set in 
Ephraim that evening (T. 69 L. 1-9). 
Sprague had taken no action regarding the first meeting 
(T. 99) and regarding the second meeting, Sprague stated (T. 99 
L. 14 through T. 100. L. 16): 
A. He met me at the Chain Saw Doctor's. I was inside 
getting down working on a project and he--at first I didn't 
know who he was because when I last talked to him it was dark 
and I didn't recognize him because it had been some time 
since I'd talked with him and I tried to figure out who he 
was, you know, I thought he was a customer who'd like to buy 
a chain saw or something and I was trying to figure out who 
he was and he mentioned something about a quarter, he talked 
to me about a quarter. 
Q. A quarter, meaning what? 
A. A quarter of an ounce. 
Q. Go ahead and tell what happened. 
A. Well, we really didn't talk too much about it. I 
just told him that I possibly might look around and see if I 
could find any for him. 
Q. What is this thing about Gunnison? 
A. I told him I heard there was some going around down 
there and just, you know, talk around town and I told him 
probably I could go down there and find some if there was. 
Q. Did you ever go to Gunnison? 
A. No, I didn't. 
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Q. Did you ever have any marijuana on that first time 
that you could have given him? 
A. No. 
Q. How about the second time? 
A. No. 
When the second meeting brought no results, Tauffer 
approached Sprague a third time. Sprague stated (T. 102 L. 4 
through T. 103 L. 21): 
A. I told him there's no way I could find any right 
there at the spot, that I'd have to ask somebody when I get 
home, off work, or out of--
Q. Did you have any money that you could have bought, 
say, a quarter ounce of marijuana, or a half ounce of 
marijuana or more? 
A. No. The money I do get is usually spent by the time 
I get it. 
Q. Tell us about the third time. What happened at that 
meeting, you met at the Bright Spot? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What happened there? 
A. I told--the part I do remember about it is I told 
him it could be possible that some, but what I know about, it 
would only be a small amount, that it would be a gram, if 
any, if the person had any still. I just said--
Q. You mean you were going to have to go and get it 
from somebody else for him? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Alright, go ahead. What happened then? 
A. I left and I come back and handed it to him and, at 
first, when I first met him, he asked me how good it was and 
I told him I didn't know for sure and I didn't even know 
anything about it other than I knew who had it and then I 
left and come back and I showed it to him and he bought it. 
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Q. How much money did you give--how much money did he 
give for it? 
A. $10.00. 
Q. Did you keep any of that money for yourself? 
A. No, I didn't. 
Q. Did you take any of that marijuana? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you get any benefit at all from the transaction? 
A. No. 
As a result of that occurrence, the information was filed 
against the defendant. Defendant further contends that inadmis-
sible evidence was improperly admitted. During the trial, the 
trial court admitted into evidence a subsequent transaction 
between Tauffer and Sprague (T. 111 L. 21 through T. 122 L. 9): 
Q. Have you ever been charged with any kind of drug 
offense in Utah County? ••• 
Q. My question, my last question was, I believe, Mr. 
Sprague, if in Utah County, you have not been charged with 
some drug related offenses? 
MR. CARTER: Your Honor, I would like to express at this 
time my objection to that question. 
THE COURT: State your objection, please. 
MR. CARTER: My objection is the line of questioning Mr. 
Frischknecht is pursuing is irrelevant to this proceeding. 
We're trying to determine if there was entrapment at this 
point, if there was a subsequent sale, between this officer 
and this gentleman in Utah County but we think that's irrele-
vant to this proceeding because we're trying to determine the 
mental attitude of the defendant at that time. 
THE COURT: Your objection's overruled. This is cross-
examination. He has taken the witness stand and the Court 
feels that it is relevant .•. 
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Q. And what was the situation in Utah County involving 
your selling? 
A. It wasn't me that was selling it. 
Q. You didn't sell anything? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. You didn't receive any money? 
A. No, I didn't. 
Q. were you there? 
A. Can we back up on a phrase? 
Q. Sure. 
A. Can you ask that again, the question? 
Q. The question was: Weren't you--I believe--weren't 
you involved in the sale of drugs in Utah County? Didn't you 
sell up there? 
A. I didn't sell. It wasn't me selling it. 
Q. were you with somebody who was selling it? 
A. What do you mean by this? 
Q. What do you mean, Mr. Sprague, when you say you 
weren't selling it? What were you doing? 
A. Well, I just knew some people up there who had it, 
that they occasionally get it, and I know where it is in Utah 
County. 
Q. So, you went there and you got it from some people 
that you knew there and you sold it to someone; isn't that 
right? 
A. I don't understand the question that well. 
Q. You went to Provo where you knew you could get it 
from some people and you got--
A. I wasn't sure about it. 
Q. But you did get some drugs from some people in 
Provo? 
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A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And what did you do with those drugs? They were 
mushrooms; weren't they? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did you do with them? 
A. Well, I personally didn't have anything to do with 
them but we went back and asked James' partner if he was 
interested. 
Q. Now, that's James Tauffer's partner and that was Ed 
Spann; wasn't it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That counsel has referred to as being another good 
looking, well-personalitied gentleman. You went back and you 
asked him if he wanted mushrooms? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did he say? 
A. He said, "Yes, if you could get an ounce." 
Q. Did you get some for him? 
A. Well, after while, we went back and forth, yes, we 
did. 
Q. So you eventually got some and you sold them to Ed 
Spann? 
A. Yes, but there was only three grams. 
Q. Only three grams? How much money did you receive 
for that? 
A. Well, at first I told him to keep his money and he 
said, "Here take this," and I says, "No," and then he would 
say, "Take it." I says, "Well, if anything, give me a couple 
of dollars to pay for the gas coming up here," but he just 
kep on insisting on giving me more. 
Q. How much did you get from him? 
A. $6.00. 
Q. You only wanted two but he gave you six? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. Now, that incident, Mr. Sprague, resulted in a 
charge against you for violation of the drug statutes in Utah 
County; isn't that correct? 
A. Yes. 
MR. FRISCHKNECHT: That's all the questions. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. CARTER: 
Q. Let's just tell the truth about that, O.K.? Mr. 
Frischknecht has gone into it so why don't you tell the jury 
how that episode came about? 
A. Well, when I first met James, he waved me down on 
the highway between Manti and Ephraim. 
Q. Now, the first time you met hirn--are you meaning 
after the 29th, after the transaction with the marijuana? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You saw him on the freeway or the--
A. I was just corning home from the game in Ephraim. 
just made a trip over there for my Morn, and he waved me down 
on the highway, and I turned around and went back and he was 
asking me if there was any way we could go to Provo that day 
and see if we couldn't get him some marijuana. 
Q. So, he brought up the subject again? 
A. Because he wanted--because his brother-in-law was up 
there and he was going up north or somewhere and he wanted to 
know if he could get it down there because he knew me and he 
said he didn't know anybody else. 
Q. Why did you do all of this, Torn? 
A. I don't know, just trying to help him out, and being 
a friend. 
Q. Did you want a friend? 
A. In a way, yes. 
Q. Why? 
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A. Because the friends I did have were immature. 
Q. Your friends had been getting married and you were 
somewhat alone or what? 
A. Yes. This town, when they grow up, they grow up 
slower than the age that you grow up with than they do in the 
city. 
Q. Now, did you have a difficult time adjusting to the 
City of Manti High School? 
A. Yes. It took me about a couple of years to adjust, 
just to where they were. 
Q. So, when this guy came to you and he suggested again 
that you take him to Provo, why did you drive all the way to 
Provo and go out of your way for him? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Tell us what happened. Did you take him to Provo? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. What kind of a car did you drive up there? 
A. A Baja Bug, Volkswagen. 
Q. It took more than a couple of dollars worth of gas; 
didn't it, to get up there and back? 
A. It took $6.00 to go up there and then I put $2.00 in 
it to drive around from Provo to Orem. 
Q. So, you went in the hole on that transaction; did 
you not? 
A. Yes, other than--
Q. And the first time you didn't receive any profit, 
you didn't receive anything at all for it; did you? 
A. No. 
Q. You did it completely for the benefit of Mr. 
Tauffer? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the second time you even had to shell out a 
couple of bucks to do it for Mr. Tauffer? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. Tell us what happened when you once got to the Provo 
or Orem area? 
A. Well, we met Spann and we talked to him about what 
he wanted and he said he wanted--1 can't remember the 
quantity he wanted, but he wanted a large amount so he could 
sell it up north. 
Q. Did you have any means to do that, to get a large 
amount of anything? 
A. Not really because I know my friends don't carry 
that much. 
Q. Tell us what happened. 
A. And we went looking for the address and I didn't 
know where my friends were living at the time because they'd 
just moved out from their old apartment and we found the 
house and they were outside talking and stuff, and then they 
were pretty well stoned on these mushrooms. 
Q. What happened? 
A. Well, we went in and started talking and then my 
friends, you know, and we were in the kitchen and standing 
there. 
Q. Who was in the kitchen? Were Mr. Spann and Mr. 
Tauffer there? 
A. Spann, we'd told Spann to meet us at Z.C.M.I. in his 
car and I took James with me to my friend's house and 
introduced him to my friends and, first they blurped out that 
they had some mushrooms right then and there and, after a 
minute, they pulled me away from James and asked me how well 
I knew him and I said, "He's pretty cool," and they accepted 
it at that and we started discussing about how much mushrooms 
were and they were--I can't remember all of it. 
Q. Okeh. 
A. But we left there. 
Q. Did Mr. Tauffer buy mushrooms there? 
A. No, he didn't. He went back to his partner Spann 
and talked to him and he said he wanted to buy an ounce or 
something like that. 
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Q. Did Mr. Spann and Mr. Tauffer go back over? 
A. No, just me and Tauffer. 
Q. Okeh. 
A. Went back. 
Q. So, you went in and bought some stuff again? 
A. Well, we didn't buy it at the time because they 
said, no, not to sell it to them because they didn't know him 
too well and they didn't want any trouble. 
Q. Did you actually get some mushrooms? 
A. We went back and they told me that. Tauf fer was in 
the car when I come back and we left again and went back to 
Spann's and I told him that, you know, that my friends didn't 
want to sell it and they didn't really have an ounce with 
them so--
Q. But you' re trying to get your friends to sell to 
Tauffer and you weren't going to be involved in it at all; is 
that right? 
A. At first, yes. 
Q. And they wouldn't sell it to Mr. Tauffer alone? 
A. No. 
Q. So you went back and then to do a buddy or a 
friendship a favor, you went back and bought them some? 
A. I went back by myself and they followed me into Orem 
and stayed in a K-Mart store and I went back to the house and 
1 ied to my friends and told them it was for me and then went 
back and gave it to--they gave me $50.00 ahead of time to go 
get it. 
Q. Tom, why did you do it for those guys if they didn't 
know you that well? And I mean you didn't know them that 
well and you'd met him three or four times before, why did 
you do it for Tauffer? 
A. To try to help out and be a friend to him. I 
thought he was going to be a friend to me if, you know, I 
tried to help him. 
Q. You let these guys use you because of that? 
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A. Well, I do a lot for my friends because it means a 
lot to me. 
Q. Have you ever sold any other drugs at any other 
time? 
A. No, I haven't. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DEFENDANT WAS ENTRAPPED AND THE JUDGMENT SHOULD BE 
REVERSED. 
The facts of the present case are strikingly similar to the 
facts of State v. Kourbelas, 621 P.2d 1238 (Utah 1980) where 
the undercover officer brought up the subject, inquired whether 
defendant could get some, the defendant responded, "I'll see what 
I can do," and defendant in Kourbelas gave the undercover agent 
his address and telephone number. 
In the present case, the defendant was initially contacted by 
the undercover officer on the 19th day of August, 1982. The 
undercover agent brought up the subject of selling marijuana. 
The agent then asked the defendant if he could get him some and 
the defendant gave the agent basically the same answer as given 
in Kourbelas. 
Approximately one week transpired wherein the defendant made 
no attempt to secure any marijuana for the undercover agent. The 
agent then sought out the defendant again to locate the agent 
some marijuana. Mr. Sprague then responded that he would see 
what he could do and set up a tentative meeting in Ephraim. The 
defendant made no effort to acquire any marijuana and thereby 
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produced no results for the undercover agent. 
In the present case, the undercover agent, for the third 
time, sought out the defendant to obtain some marijuana although 
rlefendant did not produce the marijuana on the previous two 
occasions. The undercover agent wanted substantially more 
marijuana but the defendant was only able to produce a small 
amount, one gram. The marijuana was obtained from another 
individual. The defendant received no benefit but did it only at 
the insistence of the officer. 
Section 76-2-303, Utah Code Annotated, provides that it is a 
"defense if the actor was entrapped in committing the offense." 
The section provides: 
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer or a person 
directed by or acting in cooperation with the officer induced 
the commission of an offense in order to obtain evidence of 
the commission for prosecution by methods creating a substan-
tial risk that the offense would be committed by one not 
otherwise ready to commit it. Conduct merely affording a 
person an opportunity to commit an offense does not consti-
tute entrapment. (Emphasis added). 
In two recent cases before the Court on the issue of 
entrapment, the Court has held that the defense of entrapment was 
met. In State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496 (Utah 1979), the Court 
specified that an objective test was to be applied to determine 
if entrapment had occurred--the focus of attention being on the 
police officer's conduct rather than the defendant's predisposi-
tion or the lack thereof. 
In evaluating the course of conduct between the government 
representative and the defendant, the transactions leading up to 
the offense, the interaction between the agent and the defendant 
13 
and the response to the inducements of the agent, are all to be 
considered in judging what the effect of the governmental agent'c 
conduct would be on the defendant. State v. Taylor_, Sll[-'''-
The Court found that under the facts of that entrap-
ment occurred. The female police agent, Stubbs, and the defen-
dant had cohabitated until the first week of July. curing the 
time they engaged in this illicit, intimate relationship, they 
were both heroin addicts who procured and injected the drugs in a 
spirit of togetherness. Although they subsequently occupied 
separate dwellings, they remained close friends. Stubbs 
submitted she shared defendant's bed some time in September, the 
same month she contacted the defendant for the purpose of making 
a controlled buy to obtain evidence to convict him. The defen-
dant was an addict who had recently undergone detoxification, had 
personally experienced the agonies of withdrawal and could 
empathize with this girl he loved who pleaded for his assistance 
in locating heroin. 
In State v. soroushairn, 571 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1977), the 
evidence showed that a police officer had enrolled at the same 
college as attended by the defendant for the sole purpose of 
finding those students who distributed drugs and marijuana. 
The narcotics officer lived at home but maintained a room in 
the college dormatory where the students believed he resided. He 
secured marijuana and threw "pot parties" in his room and in his 
car. He fraternized with the students. He made friends with a 
student and urged him to obtain marijuana or, failing that, to 
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put him (the officer) in contact with someone who could secure 
t lie substance. 
The student introduced the officer to the defendant and they 
also became friends. When asked at trial if he had any indica-
tion that the defendant was an individual who would get involved 
in selling marijuana, the officer replied, "I had no indication." 
The officer took the student and the defendant in his own 
automobile to a place in town where he had been directed by the 
student. He gave the appellant $20.00 and asked him to get two 
bags of marijuana. The appellant went into the house and 
returned with the two bags and delivered them to the officer. 
For almost a week thereafter, the officer visited the appellant 
and importuned him to get more marijuana. 
On all occasions, the defendant told the officer that the 
"contact" did not have any. Finally, on the eighth day after the 
first buy, the appellant, again at the importuning of the 
officer, rode with him to the home of the "contact" where the 
officer gave the defendant $40.00 and requested that he buy four 
packages of marijuana. 
The defendant brought two bags and $20.00 back to the car 
saying that the wife of the contact told him that was all they 
could sell him. The officer claimed that the two bags were for 
someone else and asked the defendant to try to get the other two 
bags. on this second try, the defendant managed to get them. 
They drove to the defendant's room where the marijuana was handed 
over to the officer. Thereafter, the officer gave to the defen-
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dant two or three joints as a courtesy. 
The Court held that the defendant had been entrapped. The 
Court stated: 
He manifested no indication of being in the mariJuana 
business; but at the importuning of the undercover officer, 
did act as his agent to buy from the real seller. There is 
nothing to suggest that the appellant would ever have dealt 
in marijuana except at the instance of and for the benefit of 
the officer. (Emphasis added). 
We think that the entrapment so permeated the entire matter 
that it also wou1d include the two joints given to the 
appellant by the narcotics officer. 
Most recently in State v. Kourbelas, supra, the Court found 
that the defendant had been entrapped. On June 13, 1979, the 
defendant and some friends were boating on Lake Powell. At that 
time, Mark Nelson was working as an undercover narcotics agent 
for the San Juan County Sheriff's Office and had been hired as an 
assistant manager of the gas dock at the marina. When the defen-
dant and his friends brought their houseboat into the marina for 
refueling, there was some problem about the gas mixture and 
Mr. Nelson intervened to help resolve it. In his conversations 
with the defendant, Nelson brought up the subject of selling 
marijuana. He told the defendant that there could be "a lot of 
money made down here if I had some way of getting some." Nelson 
then asked: "Can you help me get some or do you know where I can 
get some?" When the defendant replied: "I'll see what I can 
do,• Nelson asked for his name, address and telephone number. 
The defendant gave that information to him and told Nelson to get 
in touch. 
About two weeks later, Nelson telephoned the defendant, 
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reminded him of their conversation at Lake Powell and asked him 
if he could get some marijuana. According to Nelson, the defen-
Jant said he could and asked how much he wanted. Nelson stated: 
"Four or five pounds." The defendant said he would call back 
later that afternoon; however, he did not do so. 
Nelson called the defendant two more times on June 30. 
Nelson said, "Hey, I hate to keep bothering you like this," and 
the defendant responded that it was "no problem at all." Nelson 
called the next morning and asked once more if the defendant 
could sell some marijuana. Defendant promised to call back. 
Later that same day, the defendant reported that he had not been 
able to contact one "LaDell" who might have some marijuana, but 
that he would keep trying. Nelson called back three days later. 
The defendant stated that he had spoken with LaDell and there 
were two pounds of marijuana available. They discussed the price 
and how the defendant could pay LaDell. When they met, the 
defendant and Nelson used some marijuana and consumed some beer. 
After the money was exchanged, the defendant was placed under 
arrest. 
The Court held: 
These facts are significant: That it was Mr. Nelson who 
first suggested the purchase of marijuana from the defendant; 
that after two weeks had passed, it was he who renewed the 
contact and the request which he followed up by calling the 
defendant at least five times and attempting to purchase the 
marijuana. This is to be considered together with the fact 
that there is no evidence that the defendant had previously 
possessed or dealt in the drug. Based on those facts, we 
think that the above quoted statement of the trial judge 
relating to whether it was a police conduct which induced 
this crime is a "crucial question, not easy to answer •• 
was a well advised observation. 
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It is our opinion that, if the rule as to the presumption of 
innocence is fairly and properly applied, there necessarily 
exists a reasonable doubt as to whether the offense committed 
was the product of the defendant's initiative and desire, or 
was induced by the persistent request of Mr. Nelson. ---,z;:ccord-
ingly, it is our conclusion that the defendant's conv1ct1on 
should be reversed. 
It is important to note the citation of the Kourbelas court 
to State v. Curtis, 542 P.2d 744 (Utah 1975), where the Supreme 
Court indicated: 
When it is known or suspected that a person is engaged in 
criminal activities, or is desiring to do so, it is not 
entrapment to provide an opportunity for such person to carry 
out his criminal intention. 
However: 
••• it is not the proper function of law enforcement 
officers, either themselves or by use of decoys or undercover 
agents, to induce persons who otherwise would be law-abiding 
into the commission of a crime. 
Defendant submits that it was the officer who made the first 
contact and brought up the subject of marijuana, and it was the 
officer who made the second and third contacts when the first 
contact proved fruitless. There is no evidence that the defen-
dant was in the business of selling marijuana and the defendant 
manifested no indications of such. The defendant performed the 
acts suggested by the officer, not for the defendant's benefit, 
but only as a favor and to the sole benefit of the officer and 
only upon the insistence and perseverance of the officer was the 
defendant able to obtain an extremely small amount from another 
person. 
If the presumption of innocence is to be given its fair and 
practical application, a presumption of innocence exists. 
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POINT II 
OVER THE OBJECTION OF DEFENSE COUNSEL, THE COURT ALLOWED INTO 
lcVIOENCE THE FACT THAT DEFENDANT HAD BEEN ARRESTED AND CHARGED 
WITH A SUBSEQUENT OFFENSE OF SELLING A NARCOTIC SUBSTANCE. 
Courts in the United States have applied two different tests 
to the defense of entrapment. The U. S. Supreme Court applies 
what is called the subjective test. This test focuses on a 
defendant's intent, or predisposition, to commit a crime. 
Hampton v. U. s., 96 S.Ct. 1646 (1976 ). A defendant who was 
predisposed to commit a crime will not be acquitted in spite of 
the police officer's inducive conduct. 
The second and more recent standard is the objective test. 
Several states have adopted this test, including California, 
Michigan and Utah. The Utah Legislature adopted it in 1973 (see 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-2-303). The Utah Supreme Court 
approved the objective test in State v. Taylor, supra. 
The defendant's state of mind is not the issue; the focus of 
attention should be the officer's conduct, and when the police 
conduct falls below a set level of propriety, the defendant is to 
be acquitted. State v. Taylor, supra; People v. Wisneski, 292 
NW2d 196 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); and People v. Barraga, 591 P.2d 
94 7 (Cal. 1979). 
Since the subjective test emphasizes a defendant's predispo-
sition, courts have allowed the prosecution to submit evidence of 
other crimes committed by the defendant. This is an exception to 
the general rule against allowing such evidence. The law allows 
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it in this case because when defendant pleads entrapment, the 
vital issue is whether the accused was predisposed to commit the 
crime; evidence of other crimes being proof of predisposition. 
See State v. Taylor, supra, p. 500, and State v. Perk ins, 4 J:i 
P.2d 50 (Utah 1967). 
The entrapment exception (permitting evidence of other 
crimes) is not justified when the court is applying the objective 
test of entrapment. Predisposition is not an issue. As was 
stated in State v. Taylor, supra, evidence of other crimes is not 
permissible in a trial where the objective test governs. 
The Utah Legislature anticipated the problem and resolved it 
in Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-2-303(6), which states: 
[i]n any hearing before a judge or jury where the 
defense of entrapment is an issue, past offenses of the 
defendant shall not be admitted except that in a trial where 
the defendant testifies he may be asked of his past 
convictions for felonies " 
The question presented by this appeal asks whether Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 76-2-303(6) precludes evidence of unproven 
criminal or civil wrongs occurring subsequent to the date of the 
charged offense but prior to trial. The officer contacted the 
defendant subsequent to August of 1982 and procured another 
purchase of a controlled substance. Said evidence was admitted 
over objection. 
Scholars have interpreted words such as "prior" and "past" to 
refer to any other crimes committed before the trial, both those 
committed before the indicted offense and those committed after 
it. See Roth W., Understanding Admissibility of Prior Bad Acts: 
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A Diagrammatic Approach, 9 Pepperdine L.R. 297 (pp. 297-298); B. 
Jefferson, California Evidence Bench Book, §21.4 (1972). See 
,, I c.o State v. Gibson, 565 P.2d 783 (Utah 1978 ); State v. Daniels, 
P.2d 880 (Utah 1978); and State v. Lopez, 451 P.2d 772 (Utah 
1969 ). (Gibson and Daniels both involved subsequent offenses yet 
applied precedent set in cases ruling on prior offenses). See 
Jiminez v. State, 582 SW2d 91 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1979); Rios v. 
State, 557 SW2d 198 (Arkansas 1977); Morrison v. State, 202 SW2d 
939 (Tex. Crim. App. 1947 ); and Evidence Benchbook, supra. 
The interpretation is justified when one considers the 
prejudice such rules are intended to prevent. 
The purpose of the rule is to forbid and prevent the convic-
t ion of an accused for one crime by the use of evidence that 
he has committed other crimes, and to preclude the inference 
that because he had committed other crimes he was more liable 
to commit the crime for which he is indicted and tried. In 
other words, it is not competent to prove that the accused 
committed other crimes of a like nature, for the purpose of 
showing that he would be likely to commit the crime charged 
in the indictment, for ordinarily such proof will not shed 
any light upon the crime with which he stands charged ••• ; 
one may be a habitual criminal and yet be innocent of the 
crime for which he is indicted and being tried. (29 AmJur2d, 
Evidence, Section 320). 
The effect of Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-2-303(6) was to 
dissolve the exception permitting evidence of other crimes when 
defendant pleads entrapment. 
The provisions of Rule 55, Utah Rules of Evidence, dictate 
that evidence of other wrongs are inadmissable with exceptions 
inapplicable here. Presently, the only justification for the 
admission of past offenses is impeachment. However, such use is 
strictly limited to convictions. Unproven criminal or civil 
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wrongs are inadmissable [Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-2-
303 ( b) l. 
Section 78-24-9, Utah Code Annotated, limits the scope ot 
inquiry upon cross-examination to previous felony convictions. 
It states: " ••• But a witness must answer as to the fact of 
his previous conviction of felony." See also State v. Kazda, 14 
U.2d 166, 382 P.2d 407, finding it error to allow an officer to 
testify as to a conversation with the defendant concerning other 
unproven charges, and State v. Hodges, 30 U.2d 367, 517 P.2d 1322 
(1974). 
Jiminez, Rios, and Morrison, supra, involved cases similar to 
the one at bar. In each case, the Court concluded that permit-
ting evidence of defendant's subsequent offenses was prejudicial 
error. 
Under the standards established in those cases and in Utah 
Rules of Evidence, Rule 55, and for the reasons discussed above, 
the trial court was in error when it permitted evidence of defen-
dant's subsequent offense to taint the proceeding; defendant was 
prejudiced in the jurors' minds and was submitted to the hardship 
of defending against an uncharged offense. He was thus denied a 
fair trial. The verdict arrived at in the trial court should be 
reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The subsequent transactions between the defendant and Officer 
Taffer were improperly admitted into trial and require a reversal 
of the judgment and an order of new trial for the defendant 
22 
herein. 
The facts as set forth herein relating to entrapment require 
cµversal and dismissal. A young man, manifesting no indication 
of being in the business of selling, sold a small amount of 
marijuana upon the insistence and importuning of the officer. 
The defendant did not benefit by the transaction but acted as an 
agent of the officer to the sole benefit of the officer. 
Further, the defendant submits that the facts of the case 
support a finding that the defendant was entrapped, or at the 
least, that there was a reasonable doubt as to the officer's 
entrapping the defendant into committing the crime and thereby 
requiring a reversal of the judgment entered herein. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ___jl1__ day of August, 1983. 
llant 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a copy of the foregoing to the 
Utah State Attorney General, Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent, 
State Capitol Building, Room 236, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, 
postage prepaid, this day of August, 1983. 
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